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“Differences in the way distinct countries subjectively value insurance products
have not come into being by chance. Patterns of appreciation are part of the culture
of a society.”
−− Geert Hofstede (1995, p.423)
1 Introduction
Insurance is fast becoming an imperative element of the financial sector that significantly
contributes to economic growth (Haiss and Sümegi, 2008). Understandably, this also makes
it a significant vulnerability of the financial system that could potentially derail it, eventu-
ally leading to a negative impact on the whole economy (Das et al., 2003; Harrington, 2009).
Admittedly, this justifies policy-makers’ motives to reform the regulatory framework of this
industry (Gaganis et al., 2015), further promoting confidence in its soundness (Cummins et
al., 2017).
Investigating the risk-taking of this domain is of paramount importance, especially as to
what the unravelled global financial crisis revealed (Tarashev et al., 2009). Consequently, a
number of studies delve into the factors driving the risk of insurers, shedding ample light
in many respects. The plethora of existing studies focuses on firm-specific determinants (see
Chen and Wong, 2004, pp.470-473, for a detailed review). Turning to the macro-level strand
of literature that our study is addressed at, we find a limited number of prior studies. These
consider country-specific characteristics, such as the the quality of institutions (Fields et al.,
2012), regulations (Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013) and competition (Cummins et al., 2017) as
drivers of the industry’s risk-taking. Arguably, these studies are greatly informative, yet far
from being exhaustive.
In particular, we find informal institutions, such as national culture -that has made its way
through the literature over the past three decades (Kirkman et al., 2006)- to be missing from
the above explanatory list. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence and prior studies in the literature
identify culture as a main determinant of financial institutions’ stability. More specifically, a
thought-provoking survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers and The Economist’s Intelli-
gence Unit among financial services professionals in May 2008 reveals that 73% of the respon-
dents identified “culture and excessive-risk taking” as the main drivers of the global financial
crisis (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).
Froman empirical point of view, the interplay between these two drivers is well-documented,
with national culture having been linked to the propensity of firms to invest in longer-term
riskier projects (Shao et al., 2013), to the degree of individuals’ financial risk-taking and pur-
chase of stocks (Breuer et al., 2014) and the overall increased risk-taking trajectory of firms
(Kreiser et al., 2010; Mihet, 2013; Li et al., 2013) and banks (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; 2014;
Ashraf et al., 2016; Ashraf and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou et al., 2017). Notwithstanding the
volume of documented evidence, to this date there is no study examining this interplay from
the viewpoint of insurance firms. Still, we believe that culture can be linked to the risk-taking
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trajectory of insurers for three main reasons that we abridge forthwith.
The first is based on abstract grounds and concerns the effect of culture on risk-taking of
entities aside of industry. More specifically, it is seemingly well-documented by the above-
mentioned studies that the risk-taking of firms or financial institutions can be attributed to
cultural effects making their way through managerial appetites for risk-taking. While this
interplay from the viewpoint of insurers has not been examined, they belong to the group of
financial institutions, in which, recent years have witnessed the lines separating insurers,
banks and other financial firms rapidly getting thinner (Baluch et al., 2011). Therefore, one
may expect similar cultural overtones when it comes to the risk-taking trajectory of this in-
dustry respectively.
The second reason insurers’ risk-taking could be linked to culture is due to their clientele
and regards the concept of ‘moral hazard’ (see e.g. Shavell, 1979; Stiglitz, 1983). This is a
specific issue of paramount importance to insurers, according to which a customer may start
behaving differently once insured. The reason is that this customer has less incentives to act
similar to the pre-insured period, as coverage will be provided in exchange for a premium, the
level of which is very difficult to accurately set due to asymmetric information. Of course, if
we accept here that our values are culturally-dependent (see e.g. Hofstede, 1980) and as such
turn out to impact our behaviour through our attitudes (see e.g. ‘value-attitude-behaviour’
hierarchy by Homer and Kahle, 1988); then, how we act under different situations (including
that one assumed in the moral hazard concept) can be partially explained by culture. Extend-
ing the latter argument, the cost of risk that insurers face -stemming from not being able to
correctly price their products and/or make correct provisions, and thus manage their assets
accordingly- can be attributed to the behaviour of customers, which is a function that, among
other factors, includes national culture.
The third reason why culture is important for the risk-taking trajectory of insurance firms
can be attributed to the very definition of insurance. In particular, insurance is an instru-
ment that one obtains to hedge a type of risk. Hofstede (1995, p.423) argues that this is ex-
actly what makes insurance an inherently “culture-sensitive” product, as it offers a feeling of
‘safety’ that is subjectively appreciated as part of a society’s culture. This, however, may imply
that patterns of insurance consumption could be attributed to cultural differences, which is
empirically proven by Chui and Kwok (2008). Reasonably, if culture is a strong predictor of
insurance consumption, this means that, combined with the argument we made previously
about the customer influence, insurers’ task to manage the risk of these assets becomes even
more crucial. In other words, assuming insurance contracts are affected by culture both in
terms of volume and of customer incentives to exercise them, insurers’ risk management is a
very complex function in which culture is worth examining.
To the best of our knowledge, the only study linking national culture and insurance this
far is that of Chui and Kwok (2008), providing findings in the direction of culture impacting
insurance consumption patterns at the macro level, leaving a crucial void at the micro-level
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unexplored. In this study, we fill this void by focusing on the interplay between national cul-
ture and insurance firms’ risk-taking. In doing so, the novelty added to the extant literature
is twofold. First, we contribute to the limited strand of literature that focuses on the macro
determinants of insurers’ risk. Second, we contribute to the broader strand of literature con-
templating the influence that culture exerts on financial decision-making which, seemingly,
has received little attention in spite of its importance (Karolyi, 2016).
To meet our research objective, we employ three cultural dimensions that have been di-
rectly associated to insurance by prior studies (see Hofstede, 1995; Chui and Kwok, 2008);
these are: power distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance. As a proxy for risk, we
use the accounting-based measure of distance to default, namely the ‘Z-score’. Our sample
consists of 801 life and non-life insurance firms operating across 42 countries over the period
2007-2016. Overall, results reveal a strong and significant link between national culture and
insurance firms’ risk-taking that holds even after controlling for a variety of firm and country-
specific attributes, alternative measures of risk, sample specifications and tests designed to
alleviate endogeneity. We will postulate that this influence may be effective through a direct
or an indirect channel. In the former, national culture exerts influence on insurance firms
through the risk-appetite of managers; whereas in the latter influence is exerted through the
behavioural patterns of the insurance firms’ clientele.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background dis-
cussion of the strands of literature and the nexus we address in this study and formulates
the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample, list of variables and methodology.
Section 4 contemplates the obtained results, testing their validity by performing some robust-
ness checks. Section 5 concludes the study and offers our thoughts on the future direction of
research.
2 Background and Hypotheses
2.1 The gravity of insurance
The role of insurance in the economy extends beyond the public’s perception of it as a risk-
transfer mechanism to diversify risk (Das et al., 2003). Its role within the financial sector con-
stantly escalates while its significant contribution to GDP growth that is derived from their
assets and investment increases at a rapid pace (Haiss and Sümegi, 2008). According to the
latest yearbook on insurance statistics (OECD, 2017, p.65), insurance penetration in theOECD
countries in 2015 ranged from 1.6% in Turkey to 36.5% in Luxembourg, with the OECD aver-
age standing at 8.8%. Admittedly, the role of financial institutions in general starts becoming
noteworthy when systemic risk rapidly increases (Tarashev et al., 2009). In the insurance
arena in particular, there is a rather long list of such examples. Das et al. (2003, p.19) list
numerous selected insurance companies that failed across 8 countries in the 90s. Yet, the case
of the insurance conglomerate, AIG, is a phenomenon most recently observed by the whole
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world, having widespread repercussions for the global economy (Harrington, 2009; Eling and
Marek, 2014). Understandably, in such turbulent times there are calls for reforms of the reg-
ulatory framework (Gaganis et al., 2015), while research of the motives behind the risk-taking
trajectory of institutions is signified.
Much of the extant literature focuses on firm-specific attributes ranging from key financial
ratios (see Chen and Wong, 2004, pp.470-473, for an in-depth review) to corporate governance
(Eling and Marek, 2014). A handful of studies focus on the determinants of risk at the macro-
level, which our paper is addressed at. More specifically, Fields et al. (2012) investigate the
interplay between institutional characteristics and risk. In particular, in a sample of 513
publicly-traded insurers operating in 66 countries, they find that greater investor protection
and contract enforceability and higher quality of government is associated with lower levels
of risk. Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013) examine the financial health of 1,762 life and non-
life insurance companies operating in 46 countries over the period 2005-2007. They find that
the power of the supervisory authorities and regulations as to the technical provisions and
investments have a strong and significant impact upon insurers’ risk. More recently, Cummins
et al. (2017) analyse 10 EU life insurance markets over the period 1999-2011, observing an
inverse relation between competition and the risk of solvency.
Admittedly, this strand of literature sheds light on micro and macro-level determinants of
insurance firms’ risk. Nonetheless, this list is far from exhaustive, especially when it comes
to the latter strand. Moreover, given the association of informal institutions, such as national
culture, with the risk-taking trajectory of other financial institutions, such as banks (Kana-
garetnam et al., 2011; 2014; Ashraf et al., 2016; Ashraf and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou et al.,
2017), and the direct association to insurance products in general (Hofstede, 1995) and their
consumption at a macro level in particular (Chui and Kwok, 2008), we conjecture that informal
institutions are crucial when it comes to the risk of insurance firms and we forthwith explain
why.
2.2 The cultural overtones for insurance
There is a variety of frameworks of national culture in the literature, themost prominent being
that of Hofstede (Kirkman et al., 2006). Hofstede, (1984, p.389) defines culture as the “collec-
tive programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one category of people from
those of another”. His seminal work, Culture’s Consequences (Hofstede, 1980), constitutes the
central study enabling the measurement of national values. Reasonably, it initiated a ‘snow-
ball effect’ leading to an ever-growing body of literature that examines how culture influences
every aspect related to decision-making and beyond (see Kirman et al., 2006, for an in-depth
review of the literature, and Karolyi, 2016, for a survey in finance).
Hofstede has long argued that managerial decisions are inevitably bound to be “culturally-
dependent” (Hofstede, 1983, p.88). From a psychological point of view, the relationship between
values and decision-making has its roots in the ‘value-attitude-behaviour hierarchy’, empiri-
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cally demonstrated by Homer and Kahle (1988). According to this theory, our values affect
our attitudes that in turn affect our behaviour. Interestingly, Weber and Hsee (1998) note that
values may in fact impact our behaviour, as to risk preference in particular, due to cultural
differences in the way we perceive risk. Admittedly, this raises questions as to whether and
how our shared values may be directly or indirectly related to the degree that societies unwit-
tingly generate ‘risk-seeking’ firms, signifying this line of research from the viewpoints of both
a more effective policy-making and an improved corporate governance (Mihet, 2013). Such
questions have been partly answered by prior studies through the use of cultural dimensions
developed by Hofstede (1980), exploring whether differences between countries as to the cru-
cial cultural values such as individualism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance impact
the risk-taking trajectory of firms (Kreiser et al., 2010; Mihet, 2013; Li et al., 2013) and finan-
cial institutions, such as banks (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; 2014; Ashraf et al., 2016; Ashraf
and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou et al., 2017). We conceptualise these cultural values below,
linking them forthwith to our research hypotheses.
2.2.1 The effect of individualism
In the Hofstede model (Hofstede, 2001), cultures scoring high on individualism give priority
to individual achievements. People in individualistic societies are more self-oriented and au-
tonomous, mainly focusing on themselves and immediate relatives. On the contrary, low scores
in this dimension reveal societies that aspire to collectivism, prioritizing the ‘we’ versus the
‘I’. People in these societies emphasize in more collective achievements, prioritizing cohesion
over individual needs.
Prior studies link individualism to overconfidence and overoptimism (Chui et al., 2010),
which in turn is positively associated with individuals’ financial risk-taking (Breuer et al.,
2014) and underestimation of risks (Van den Steen, 2004). This may be pertinent to consider
for both managers and customers of insurance firms, as both may express individualistic traits
that could directly or indirectly increase the risk-taking trajectory of the insurer. More specif-
ically, from the viewpoint of managers, Li et al. (2013) postulate that individualism is in line
with a firm’s practice of inducing equity-based managerial compensation which is associated
with greater managerial risk-taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Low, 2009; Milidonis and
Stathopoulos, 2011). Moreover, Mourouzidou et al. (2017) conjecture that this influence of
individualism extends to the whole environment of the firm that the manager caters for, with
managers in individualistic societies increasing risk-taking to maximize shareholders’ wealth.
From the viewpoint of insurance customers, individualism may be pertinent to the trajec-
tory of insurance firms as to the concept of ‘moral hazard’. In particular, a highly individualistc
customer may consider the insurance agreement as a ‘risk-transfer’ mechanism that leads to
the fundamental conflict as stated by Stiglitz (1983, p.6): “[...] the more and better insurance
that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid the in-
sured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of their actions”. This conflict is in
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line with the incentives of strongly individualistic societies. Moreover, in these societies, in-
surees’ self-enhancement bias and their stringent preference of market-based insurance over
the social network system have both been linked to higher insurance consumption (Chui and
Kwok, 2008) that could potentially enforce the impact of the previous argument, as both the
volume of contracts will be higher, and the propensity of customers to yield when the concept
of moral hazard appears.
Collectively considering the above, we postulate that individualism will be positively re-
lated to insurers’ risk, either through the risk appetite of managers or the firm’s clientele.
H1. Individualism is positively associated with insurance firm risk.
2.2.2 The effect of uncertainty avoidance
Uncertainty avoidance shows the degree to which members in a society feel uncomfortable
with uncertainty and ambiguity (Hofstede, 2001). Cultures with high scores in this dimen-
sion are hesitant about ambiguity around them, preferring clear rules of conduct and a more
predictable environment. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) find that bank-based financial systems
thrive in these cultures, as they provide a higher security on returns (e.g. deposit insurance)
in contrast to equity-based systems that, while providing a higher rate of return, their daily
fluctuations pose a serious source of uncertainty.
Overall, uncertainty avoidance is of utmost importance to firms in which information un-
certainty is greater due to the inherent complexity in estimating and managing risk (Mihet,
2013). Undoubtedly, insurance firms are such examples, constantly trying to price their ser-
vices in such a way that balances the risk and incentive effects under fierce concepts like ‘moral
hazard’ (Stiglitz, 1983). From the viewpoint of managers, while CEOs are generally more risk-
tolerant than the lay population; traits such as risk-aversion are naturally affecting corporate
actions too (Graham et al., 2013). Of course, being uncertain-averse does not necessarily mean
taking less risks, but potentially taking more calculated risks (Mihet, 2013). This is in line
with the conjectures of Li et al (2013) that managers in risk-averse cultures tend to avoid
innovative projects, or require a higher risk-premium for them.
Arguably, from the viewpoint of customers, those sharing traits of high uncertainty avoid-
ance type could be seen to pose a lower level of risk for insurers. The reason is that individuals
sharing such traits shun uncertainty and any form of risk in general. Therefore, the propensity
to change their behaviour increasing the risk of exercising their contract after they sign it (i.e.
in the concept of moral hazard) arguably remains low. In that sense, we postulate that insur-
ers may predict the risk of customers more accurately, and as such price their contracts more
efficiently, make better provisions and thus face less unpredicted risks, when their clientele
shares traits of low uncertainty avoidance type.
Collectively considering the above, we conjecture that uncertainty avoidance will be nega-
tively related to insurers’ risk, either through the lower risk appetite of managers or the firms’
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uncertainty-averse clientele.
H2. Uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with insurance firm risk.
2.2.3 The effect of power distance
Power distance shows the degree to which a society accepts inequality that stems from dif-
ferences in physical and intellectual capacities (Hofstede, 2001). Cultures scoring high on
this dimension accept more easily these inequalities, eventually forming a social stratifica-
tion. Cultures with low scores on this dimension do not accept the status quo, challenging it
in advancing their personal or in-group’s interests.
Managers in such cultures are more eager to engage in risky behaviours in order to better
their firm’s standing (Shane, 1993). Consequently, according to Kreiser et al. (2010, p.963),
these managers will be more willing to enact “risky offensive strategies”, as opposed to man-
agers in high power distance cultures that are more likely to adopt “fortify-and-defend” prac-
tices that solidify the firm’s position in the industry. The authors also conjecture that orga-
nizations in such cultures tend to implement tight control mechanisms, in which individuals
have considerably less autonomy to make “bold decisions” and as such the organizations will
be associated with lower levels of risk. In complementing the latter, Hofstede (1984) argues
that in low power distance cultures people are less likely to comply with their superiors, ul-
timately acting on their own, which, combined with the arguments that individuals in said
cultures are more intent on bettering their position (Kreiser et al., 2010), means that it may
well result in a relationship conflict within the firm. For instance, Frijns et al (2016, p.538)
illustrate how such conflicts may arise within a firm, arguing that “in a low power distance
society, people are often encouraged to share their alternative views. These differences sug-
gest that directors may perceive the group dynamics of the board differently, which may result
in relationship conflict”. According to the authors, this dimension may in fact influence the
directors’ eagerness to share their opinions due to potentially induced relationship conflicts.
In an alternative, but complementary interpretation, Doney et al. (1998, p.613) argue
that this dimension essentially addresses the “predominance of norms for conformity (doing
what is accepted and proper)” [e.g. high power distance cultures] versus “independence (doing
whatever one wants to do)” [e.g. low power distance cultures]. Clearly, and as the authors also
postulate, the latter results in hampering the trust between two parties, e.g. a firm and its
clientele, as to the former’s ability to predict the latter’s behaviour. On the other hand, high
power distance cultures greatly regard predictability in relationships, which “paves the way
for trust [e.g. among two parties] to form”. Understandably, taking this to the situation where
insurers and insured being two parties among which trust is a key element that potentially
softens the issue of moral hazard, customers in high power distance cultures will be more
trustful, conforming to the norms and be more predictable as to their behaviour post-contract.
Taking into consideration the above, we postulate that power distance will be negatively
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related to insurance firms’ risk through conflicts and behaviours attributed to managers or
insured individuals in such cultures.
H3. Power distance is negatively associated with insurance firm risk.
We have hereby conjectured that the considered dimensions of national culture may exert a
negative (uncertainty avoidance, power distance) or positive (individualism) influence on in-
surers’ risk-taking through the managers or the clientele’s culture-specific traits. It is worth
noting that a limitation of our study at this point is that, due to data unavailability regard-
ing the behavioural concepts and preferences of both groups (i.e. risk appetite of managers
and change in risk of customers after signing an insurance contract), we cannot prove such a
causal relationship from these two channels. Thereby, similarly to past studies in the litera-
ture examining the impact of national culture on the risk-taking of firms (Kreiser et al., 2010;
Mihet, 2013; Li et al., 2013) and banks (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; 2014; Ashraf et al., 2016;
Ashraf and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou et al., 2017), the channels through which culture flows
impacting the risk trajectory of insurers will remain a conjecture while we quantify the overall
effect these dimensions have upon the risk of insurers irrespective of the channel. That is, we
measure the direct, overall effect of culture upon insurers’ risk-taking.
3 Sample, Variables and Methodology
We obtain all firm-specific variables from the SNL Financial (S&P Global Market Intelligence
Platform). Our sample consists of 801 life and non-life insurance firms operating across 42
countries over the period 2007-20161, structured in an unbalanced panel of 6,271 observations.
We give further details the considered variables and the estimated model in the following
subsections.
3.1 Variables
3.1.1 Risk of insurance firms
We measure the risk of insurance firms with the natural logarithm of the accounting-based
measure of distance to default, namely the ‘Z-score’2 that is constructed as follows:
Z-scorei,t =
ROAi + EAi
σROAi
, (1)
1This database offers a broad cross-country coverage on insurance firms from 2005 onward, as data for the pre-
ceding years almost exclusively concern US firms. Furthermore, given that our dependent variable is constructed
with a three-year rolling window period (see subsection 3.1.1 for more details), our final sample eventually starts
from the year 2007.
2This is the main risk measure employed for our baseline results. For alternative proxies of risk see robustness
analysis, section 4.2.
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where ROAi is the temporal mean of Return to Assets (ROA) for firm i, EAi is the temporal
mean of Equity to Assets ratio (EA) for firm i and σROAi is the standard deviation of Return to
Assets for firm i. All three above-mentioned components of this measure are computed within
a three-year time rolling window to smooth the ‘Z-score’ values, avoiding them from being
driven by sudden changes in ROA or EA (see Schaeck et al., 2011, p.212 for more details).
This means that, for instance, the Z-score of the year 2007 is constructed taking into account
the three-year time period 2005-2007.
This measure is frequently used in both the banking (see Boyd et al., 1993; Laeven and
Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010), and the insurance literature (Shim, 2011; 2017; Pasiouras
and Gaganis, 2013; Milidonis et al., 2017). Essentially, it shows the number of standard devia-
tions below the mean that profits must decrease to completely deplete equity. Thereby, higher
figures indicate lower risk of solvency and vice versa. ‘Z-score’ boasts some desirable proper-
ties, among which of particular importance for our case is that it is objective in measuring risk
across different groups, such as life and non-life insurance (Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013). We
will hereby use its natural logarithm to control for non-linear effects and outliers, while we
also trim the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove more persistent outliers that were found not
having been treated by the use of the natural logarithm. Finally, to be consistent with the
interpretation of this measure as risk, similarly to prior studies in the national culture strand
of literature using this measure (e.g. Mihet, 2013; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Mourouzidou
et al., 2017), we invert it multiplying eq(1) by minus one. Therefore, higher values of the de-
pendent variable now indicate greater risk and vice-versa. We will henceforth refer to this
measure as “Risk”.
3.1.2 National culture
In section 2, we provided a background discussion of the variables that will be used as proxy for
national culture, namely individualism, uncertainty avoidance and power distance (see sub-
sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 accordingly). These are obtained by Hofstede (see Hofstede, 1980; 2001,
for a detailed analysis of each dimension, their origin and method of construction), and they
ultimately measure each dimension of culture according to the Hofstede framework on a 0−100
scale. These dimensions have jointly or individually appeared in over 180 studies in top-tier
business and psychological journals (see Kirkman et al., 2006, for a cross-discipline review, and
Karolyi, 2016, for a survey in finance). According to Kirkman et al. (2006) there have been few
critiques that these dimensions could be overly simplistic in collapsing individual attributes
to a single dimension. Yet, as the author argues, their use in top-tier journals proves their
broader acceptance among scholars in a variety of disciplines. As per the hypotheses H1 to H3
made in subsections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 respectively, we expect a positive relationship between indi-
vidualism and risk and a negative relationship among uncertainty avoidance/power distance
and risk.
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3.1.3 Control variables
In the analysis of the link between national culture and risk-taking in the insurance industry,
we control for various firm and country-specific characteristics. With respect to the former,
following Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013), we control for the size, organizational form and busi-
ness activity of the insurance firms that have been proved to be significant determinants when
it comes to insurance firms’ risk of solvency (Cummins et al., 1995; Adams, 1996; Adams et
al., 2003). More specifically, we proxy size with the natural logarithm of total assets (hereafter
referred to as ‘SIZE’); organizational form with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the firm is a stock insurer (i.e. publicly-traded, thus controlled by a group of shareholders) and
0 if it is a mutual insurer (hereafter referred to as ‘STOCK’). We proxy the business activity
of insurance firms with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the insurer engages in
long-term (i.e. life insurance) and 0 if the insurer engages in short-term (i.e. property/casualty
insurance) business segments (hereafter referred to as ‘LIFE’). This captures potential differ-
ences in actuarial principles, notice for changes in underwriting terms, adjustments for unan-
ticipated losses, etc. (Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2013).
We include a variety of cross-country variables that capture several forms of heterogeneity,
as to macroeconomic, insurance, institutions and finance-related aspects of the countries that
the insurers operate in. These are individually and jointly included in the analysis (see section
4 for further details). Macroeconomic variables capture problems in the financial sector and
monetary instability across the countries in our sample. More specifically, we include GDP
growth (herafter reffered to as ‘GDPGR’), as the likelihood of issues in the financial sector to
arise is greater when GDP growth is low (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 1998). Moreover, inflation
rate (hereafter ‘INFL’) captures the monetary instability in a country, with higher values de-
noting countries that have underdeveloped financial systems and experience financial crises
Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 1998). Following Pasiouras and Gaganis (2013), we use the ratio of in-
surance premium to GDP (hereafter ‘PREM’) as proxy for the overall development of the insur-
ance industries across countries. In addition, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
to measure the degree of competition (see e.g. Boyd et al., 2006; De Nicoló and Loukoianova,
2007) among insurers across countries, which is defined as the sum of the squared market
shares of each insurer in each country and year. Data for GDPGR and INFL stem from World
Bank’s national accounts data, PREM is obtained from the Global Financial Development
Database (June 2017 version), while HHI is constructed elaborating on SNL Financial data.
Next, we control for the overall quality of the institutions across countries in our sample. There
is a rich discussion in the IAIS core principles (2003, p.7) regarding the need for “a reliable,
effective, efficient and fair legal and court system [...] whose decisions are enforceable”. Pa-
siouras and Gaganis (2013, p.635) conjecture that “[...] in countries with low legal protection,
corruption and overall poor quality of legal institutions, there may be higher opportunities for
gambling and risk-taking”. The Worlwide Governance Indicators database is a great source in
this respect, offering aggregate indicators of six broad dimensions of governance, namely Voice
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and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of
Law andControl of Corruption (for more information on the sources, methodology and analysis
of each, see Kauffmann et al., 2010). We build an overall index of institutional development
(hereafter ‘INSTDEV’) using the non-weighted arithmetic average of the six aforementioned
dimensions of governance3. Although it is often conceptually criticised, it still remains the
most frequent scheme to the construction of composite indicators in the absence of a theoreti-
cal framework or an expert’s opinion to justify differential weighting (see Greco et al., 2018, for
a review). Finally, we control for heterogeneity related to the stock markets across countries.
More specifically, we use the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (hereafter ‘CAP’), as
large stock markets are more liquid thus offering the ability to mobilize capital and diversify
risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996), and stock price volatility (hereafter ‘VOL’), excess val-
ues of which may cripple investment (De Long et al., 1989). We obtain both variables from the
Global Financial Development Database (June 2017 version).
Table 1 contains summary statistics for all variables mentioned above. Table 2 reports the
correlation coefficients among them.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Around Here]
3.2 Methodology
To explore the effect that national culture exerts on insurance firms’ risk, while controlling for
several firm and country-specific characteristics, we employ regressions of the following form:
Riski,k,t = α+ β1Firmi,k,t + β2Countryk,t + γCulturek + δY eart + εi,k,t (2)
where i corresponds to insurance firm i, k corresponds to country k, t corresponds to year t.
Riski,k,t is the inverse of ‘Z-score’, for firm i, in country k in year t. Turning to the explanatory
variables, Firmi,k,t denotes firm-specific attributes for insurance firm i in country k in year t;
Countryk,t denotes country-specific attributes (see Panel B, Table 1) in country k in year t, and
Culturek is a vector of national culture variables in country k. Y eart includes year dummies
in time t, and εi,k,t denotes residuals.
We estimate a static model instead of a dynamic onemainly due to the time-constant nature
of the variables of interest (i.e. national culture). This is in accordance with similar studies
(see e.g. Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; 2014) utilizing such static specifications to estimate their
respective models. Yet, we believe that we capture a generous amount of heterogeneity across
firms and countries as well as temporal heterogeneity across the panel -via the use of firm
3Due to very high correlation among the dimensions, it is not feasible to use them jointly in regression analysis.
However, we do test them individually in additional (unreported) regressions, finding no significant difference sings
and significance-wise as to both the key and control explanatory variables.
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and country-specific variables and year dummies respectively-, thus isolating these from in-
ducing bias in the parameters of interest (i.e. coefficient γ in eq.2). Furthermore, we correct
for heteroskedasticity and serial dependence by estimating our model with robust standard
errors clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009). We begin estimating (2) as a baseline model of
only firm-specific variables and year dummies, adding one set of country-level variables (i.e.
macroeconomic, insurance, institutional and stock market-related) at a time for each consid-
ered dimension of national culture (columns 1 to 5 in Tables 3, 4 and 5), eventually controlling
jointly for all these attributes at the end (column 6 in Tables 3, 4 and 5). Considering the
panel nature of our sample, we use a random effects model to fit these specifications, which
is validated by the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test. Yet, we should note that the
use of OLS did not alter the results by any means. We report all results in Tables 3, 4 and
5. We discuss them in the following section and we forthwith test their validity by performing
some additional robustness checks.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Base Results
We regress a measure of risk (inverse of ‘Z-score’) on dimensions of national culture, control-
ling for various firm and country-specific attributes, the latter related to a spectrum ranging
frommacroeconomic to stock-market controls. We are ultimately interested in collectively con-
trolling for all these attributes to isolate the effect of national culture as much as possible, yet,
we also run and report regressions involving one set of attributes at a time. Tables 3, 4 and
5 report all regressions of our baseline results. As discussed in the Methodology section, we
make use of a random effects (RE) model to exploit the panel nature of our sample, the validity
of which is confirmed by the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test. For space-saving
reasons, where possible, we will restrict the discussion of results to the overall model (column
(6) in Tables 3, 4 and 5)4.
[Insert Tables 3,4 and 5 Around Here]
Consistent with our first hypothesis, individualism appears to be positively associated to
insurance firms’ risk. This conjecture is statistically validated for all specifications (Columns
(1) to (6) in Table 3). In particular, by collectively controlling for all considered attributes,
individualism is positively associated with insurance firm risk at the 1% level of significance
(γIDV = 0.00227, p < 0.01, see Table 3, column (6)). Therefore, the higher a country scores in
this cultural dimension, the worse the implications for the insurance firms operating in this
4In an alternative specification, we split our sample in life and non-life insurance firms on the basis of culture
influencing their risk levels in differentmanners. In performing the above set of regressions separately (unreported
for brevity) we find no significant difference among the two.
13
National Culture and Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Insurance Industry C. GAGANIS et al.
country. This is in line with previous studies negatively associating individualism to the risk-
taking trajectory of SMEs (Kreiser et al., 2010), firms (Mihet, 2013; Li et al., 2013) and banks
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; 2014; Ashraf et al., 2016; Ashraf and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou
et al., 2017). Delving into quantifying the effect of individualism, after controlling for macro,
insurance, institutional and stock market characteristics, insurance firms operating in a coun-
try that on this cultural dimension scores one standard deviation (σIDV = 24.06) higher than
the average country’s score (µIDV = 64.73) are expected to be, on average, roughly 5.46% more
risky (γIDV × σIDV ), all other things held constant.
Moving to the second cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance -as expected according to
our second hypothesis- is negatively associated with insurance firms’ risk. In testing this hy-
pothesis, we find strong evidence of this relationship across all specifications (columns (1) to
(6) in Table 4) of our baseline results at the 1% level of significance. This implies that higher
scores in this cultural dimension indicate lower levels of risk for the insurance firms operat-
ing in this country. Prior studies in the domains of SMEs (Kreiser et al., 2010), firms (ihet,
2013; Li et al., 2013) and banks (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; 2014; Ashraf et al., 2016; Ashraf
and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou et al., 2017) confirm this inverse relationship between uncer-
tainty avoidance and risk-taking. Turning to the economic impact this relationship entails in
our sample (γUAI = −0.00424, p < 0.01, see Table 4, column (6)), having controlled for vari-
ous firm and country-specific attributes, insurance firms operating in a country that scores
one standard deviation (σUAI = 21.381) higher than the average uncertainty averse country
(µUAI = 57.352) are expected to be, on average, 9.07% less risky (γUAI × σUAI ), all other things
equal.
Finally, we find an inverse relationship between the power distance index and insurance
firms’ risk that is statistically verified in five out of the six specifications of our base results (i.e.
apart from ‘Stock Market’ specification, column (5) of Table 5). Considering our overall model
(column (6) in Table 5), this cultural dimension is inversely related to insurers’ risk at the 1%
level of significance (γPDI = −0.00375, p < 0.01), implying that countries scoring high in this
dimension are expected to be on average less risky. This relationship has been also verified
by prior studies in the domains of SMEs (Kreiser et al., 2010), firms (Mihet, 2013) and banks
(Ashraf et al., 2016; Ashraf and Arshad, 2017; Mourouzidou et al., 2017). Particularly for
our sample, and having controlled for and holding other attributes constant, insurance firms
operating in a country that is one standard deviation (σPDI = 19.859) higher than the average
country’s score (µPDI = 49.012) of this dimension are expected to be roughly 7.45% less risky.
Overall, we find that cultural dimensions indeed affect the risk-taking of insurance firms.
Consistent with our hypotheses and prior studies in the literature, we find positive cultural
overtones as to the dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, and negative
cultural overtones as to the dimension of individualism.
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4.2 Robustness checks
We test the sensitivity of the obtained results in three distinct ways. First, we estimate the
Model of eq.(2) regressing alternative measures of risk. More specifically, following prior stud-
ies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 2011; and more recently, Doumpos et al., 2015) we dis-
aggregate the dependent variable (inverse of ‘Z-score’) into its two main ratio components:
ZPRi,t = ROAiσROAi and ZLRi,t =
EAi
σROAi
. The former, ZPR, multiplied by minus one, exhibits
the portfolio risk of an insurance firm, while the latter, ZLR, also multiplied by minus one,
indicates leverage risk. We find no change in the dynamics between the key variables of inter-
est and insurance firm risk, with all parameters of interest exhibiting the expected sign and
statistical significance at the 1% level for all cultural variables. These results are reported
in specifications (1) and (2) of Table 6 for each cultural dimension accordingly. Moreover, we
have also used the standard deviation of ROA (σROA) for a three-year rolling window period
(unreported) as an alternative proxy of risk, finding no differences whatsoever.
A second way we test the validity of our results is to see whether the observed effects are
attributed to turbulent periods, such as the recent global financial crisis. Insurance tradi-
tionally poses less systemic risk than banks, though recent years have seen the distinction
between these two types of financial institutions getting thinner, forming ever-closer ties that
are often abbreviated to “bancassurance” (Baluch et al., 2011, p.126). While we limit the bias
of our parameters of interest (i.e. γIDV , γPDI , γUAI ) as to the timely factors by accounting for
temporal heterogeneity (e.g. adding year dummies in the estimation of our model of interest),
admittedly, the recent financial turmoil had significant repercussions echoed throughout the
financial systems around the globe. Thus, from a sensitivity perspective, it is interesting to
validate whether excluding this turbulent period from our sample may alter the results. More
specifically, we re-estimate our overall model excluding this time the period around the global
financial crisis (e.g. years 2007 to 2009)5. We report these results in specification (3) of Table
6 for each cultural dimension accordingly. We find no evidence contradicting our baseline re-
sults, with the parameters of interest, i.e. γIDV, γUAI and γPDI, being significant at the 5%, 1%
and 1% levels accordingly.
Last but not least, we address the issue of endogeneity of culture by employing an instru-
mental variable (IV) approach to isolate its exogenous component. Our concerns about en-
dogeneity are linked to three common sources: reverse causality, omitted variable bias and
measurement error.
In regard to the first, it is important to recall that the main purpose of our study is to
examine the impact of national culture on the risk-taking behaviour of insurers. However,
one could argue that the causal effect arises via the opposite route, hence the issue of reverse
causality. We argue that this is highly unlikely as a generally accepted notion is that a nation’s
cultural norms evolve very slowly over large periods of time (Williamson, 2000; Hofstede et al.
5Due to the nature of our dependent variable, i.e. constructed in a three-year rolling window, we also exclude
years 2010 and 2011 that contain the GFC period as well.
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2010) as opposed to the risk element that is muchmore volatile over time. Thus, it is less likely
that it is the insurance sector’s risk to be driving national culture.
When it comes to omitted variable bias and measurement error, our primary concern could
be that the impact of national culture on bank risk could be driven by other factors that have
not been considered or are unobservable. Although we consider a range of country and firm-
level characteristics throughout our main analysis, there may be a possibility that some ele-
ments are not taken into account. Moreover, measurement error of our explanatory variables
of interest could potentially further influence our results. For these reasons, we perform the
IV analysis abbreviated forthwith (see Appendix B for more details) accounting, up to some
extent, for such concerns.
The fundamental prerequisite of an IV analysis is the choice of proper instrumental vari-
ables from both a conceptual and amethodological perspective. Particularly, instruments need
to be selected carefully in that they intrinsically relate (both concept and correlation-wise) to
the first stage dependent variable (i.e. culture), but not with the residuals of the second stage
regression. We hereby select factors inherently related to culture, such as religion, geography
and language (see e.g. Hofstede, 2001). Following prior studies (e.g. Kwok and Tadesse, 2006;
Li et al., 2013; Mourouzidou et al., 2017; Boubakri et al., 2017), we proxy geography with world
region dummies that a country belongs to (see Appendix B for more details), we proxy religion
with the population’s fraction in each of the three most spread religion faiths (i.e. Roman
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim) and language with the fraction of the population speaking the
official language. With respect to the specification and validity of the instruments, as expected
following their historical use in past studies, they pass all three tests related to under, over
and weak identification respectively, while the significance of the instruments and the overall
F-test of the first stage regressions further enhance the overall validity of this specification.
We report first stage regressions and the respective tests of the IV analysis in Appendix B.
Second stage results are reported in specification (4) of Table 6. Seemingly, all three cultural
dimensions hold their statistical significance (pIDV < 0.01, pUAI < 0.01, pPDI < 0.1), and their
signs intact.
[Insert Table 6 Around Here]
4.3 Implications of cultural overtones
Concluding this section, a question that follows naturally regards the implications of the cul-
tural overtones discussed up to this point. Indeed, informal institutions are crucial and bare
implications worth discussing for several reasons, starting from abstract grounds on policy-
making and ending on insurers’ decision-making in particular.
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From a policy-making perspective, understanding the existence of cultural overtones on
insurers’ risk is detrimental in several ways. To begin with, if culture is a factor explain-
ing the different perceptions of risk across countries (Weber and Hsee, 1998), it may well be
the cause that we unwittingly generate risk-seeking firms exactly due to these different per-
ceptions being fabricated into our daily actions. Thus, a better set of policies acknowledging
this confounding situation and takes respective action is worth considering (Mihet, 2013). For
instance, when it comes to policymakers, a set of policies promoting innovation could be intro-
duced in not so innovative (conservative) countries, or, oppositely, a set of policies promoting
conservatism in risk could be introduced in countries where the perception of risk is lower.
Generally, the findings of our study provide further insight on the policy-making procedure,
eventually highlighting that, when it comes to shaping global supervisory standards, one size
does not fit all. In particular, for the design of more effective global supervisory standards of
insurance firms, not only is important to consider formal institutional factors (such as the po-
litical environment or a country’s regulatory and supervisory architecture), but also informal
institutional factors (such as culture), which convey the inherent values and beliefs of locals.
Turning to the implications as to firm decision-making, the role of culture is twofold to the
very least. First and on a more general note, as mentioned in Kelley et al. (1987, p.18), an
essential question that cross-cultural management research aims to answer is the one posed
by Adler (1983), as to what extent culture impacts upon an individual’s behaviour in the work-
place. This is a question that according to Laurent (1983) is crucial to consider, given that
employees in multi-national settings retain their culturally-specific work behaviours in spite
of common management policies and procedures. That said, culture could arguably impact
firm outcomes through employees’ culture-specific attributes either at the level of upper ech-
elons or lower ranks of the organization. Second, and most related to our findings, insurance
products per se are of “national character” (Hofstede, 1995) and are designed to cater the needs
and beliefs of local clients. This is even more pronounced when examining international in-
surance companies that expand their operations in multiple regions as, in such cases, these
companies need to follow a set of rules and practices that is in accordance with the local needs,
values and characteristics. Therefore, a management acknowledging this situation and taking
respective action is of great importance for the trajectory of the firm.
5 Conclusion
There is a long discussion on the forms of national culture and the influence it may exert in
many respects. Over the past years, several studies document such relationships in a variety
of domains that contemplate and shed light in these types of influences. Admittedly, and as
have been previously argued in the literature, scholarship in finance has paid considerably
less attention in contrast to other domains; yet, the number of studies considering national
culture is constantly increasing.
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Prior studies link national culture to corporate risk-taking, while more recent ones provide
evidence of this interplay from the viewpoint of banks. Yet, to this day, insurance firms have
not been considered in this stream of research despite their intrinsic link to informal institu-
tions. More specifically, it has been argued that insurance is a culture-specific product that
is subjectively valued according to cultural patterns, while the only empirical study in this
domain links insurance consumption to national culture.
In this study, we provide supporting evidence of the influence culture exerts on the risk-
taking of insurance firms. In a sample covering 801 firms across 42 countries over the pe-
riod 2007-2016, we find a positive relationship between individualism and risk-taking and a
negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance or power distance and risk-taking. We
conjecture that these effects might be attributed to the insurance firms’ manager or clientele’s
incentives, both driving the risk-taking trajectory through behavioural patterns that could be
linked to national culture.
Overall, our findings relate to and reinforce two distinct strands of literature. The first
concerns the determinants of insurance firms’ risk, particularly the macro-level ones, the list
of which is admittedly limited. The second strand of literature our paper is addressed at
relates to the intersection of national culture and financial decision-making literatures, where
arguably, considerably less attention has been given to. We believe that both these strands of
literature require more attention, while they pose a fruitful avenue of research; particularly
as to how national culture might go far in explaining voids in them. Hence, we hope that with
this study we have greased the wheels for future research.
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6 Appendices
Appendix A: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Z-score Natural logarithm of ROAi+EAiσROAi for a 3-year rolling-window period.
Authors’ elaboration
based on data from
SNL Financial
Risk Multiplication of the natural logarithm of ‘Z-score’ by minus one.
Authors’ elaboration
based on data from
SNL Financial
LSIZE Natural Logarithm of a firm’s Total Assets. SNL Financial
LIST Dummy variable, distinguishing between mutual (0) and stock insurers (1). SNL Financial
LIFE Dummy variable, distinguishing whether an insurance firm engages inlong-term (life) or short-term business (property/casualty) segments. SNL Financial
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index, HHIkt =
∑n
i=1 share
2
ikt, where shareikt
is the market share of firm i operating in country k in year t.
Authors’ elaboration on
SNL Financial data
PREM Insurance premiums (%GDP). Global FinancialDevelopment Database
GDPGR Annual GDP growth (%). World Bank
INFL Annual inflation rate (%). World Bank
CAP Stock market capitalization (CAP) is the total value of all listed sharesin a stock market as a percentage of GDP.
Global Financial
Development Database
VOL Stock price volatility (VOL) is the average of the 360-day volatility ofthe national stock market index.
Global Financial
Development Database
INSTDEV
Level of Institutional Development, as proxied by a non-weighted arithmetic
average of the following dimensions: Voice Accountability, Political Stability,
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.
Worldwide Governance
Indicators Database
PDI Power Distance Index (Hierarchy). Hofstede (2001)
IDV Individualism vs Collectivism. Hofstede (2001)
UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index. Hofstede (2001)
Appendix B: Instrumental Variables Analysis
In the instrumental variables (IV) analysis we estimate the following two-stage model:
Culturek = ζ + η1languagek + η2religionk + η3geographyk + θ1Firmi,k,t + θ2Countryk,t + κY eart + ri,k,t
Riski,k,t = α+ β1Firmi,k,t + β2Countryk,t + γCulturek + δY eart + εi,k,t
where i corresponds to insurance firm i, k corresponds to country k, t corresponds to year t.
Riski,k,t is the inverse of ‘Z-score’, for firm i, in country k in year t, Firmi,k,t denotes firm-specific
attributes for insurance firm i in country k in year t, Countryk,t denotes country-specific at-
tributes in country k in year t, Culturek is a vector of national culture variables in country
k, Y eart includes year dummies in time t, ri,k,t and εi,k,t are the residuals of the first and
second stage regressions respectively. languagek is the first instrument exhibiting the per-
centage of population in country k speaking the official language (see Alessina et al., 2003,
for more details and source of original data). geographyk includes world region dummies tak-
ing the value of 1 if country k belongs to the specified region (e.g. Europe, America, Asia,
Oceania) and 0 otherwise. Information on the world regions are obtained from the World At-
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las (www.worldatlas.com). Finally, religionk includes variables related to the percentage of the
population of country k aspiring to the threemost spread religious faiths (e.g. Roman Catholic,
Protestants, Muslim) from the study of La Porta et al. (1999). The following table reports the
first and second stage results along with the weak, under and over-identification tests.
Instrumental Variables (IV) analysis results
First Stage Results
(1) (2) (3)
IDV UAI PDI
Roman Catholic -0.1105** 0.1942*** 0.01467
(0.0531) (0.061) (0.0301)
Protestants 0.0181 -0.2391*** -0.1269***
(0.0511) (0.0478) (0.0355)
Muslim 0.0377* 0.097*** 0.0896***
(0.0209) (0.033) (0.0272)
Asia -62.942*** 15.514*** 16.406***
(2.9197) (4.039) (1.6096)
Oceania -3.3898** -3.10* 0.0872
(1.4261) (1.886) (1.603)
Europe -26.923*** 2.755* 4.414***
(0.9014) (1.562) (0.7934)
Language 9.958*** -1.584 0.4751
( 3.002) (3.879) (2.863)
Constant 60.408*** 84.185*** 81.448***
(5.809) (6.516) (4.070)
Firm-characteristics YES YES YES
Country-characteristics YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
F-test 875*** 47.60*** 71.34***
Second Stage Results
IDV 0.00348***
(0.00101)
UAI -0.00522***
(0.00144)
PDI -0.00397*
(0.00228)
Constant -1.654*** -1.016*** -1.188***
(0.152) (0.219) (0.292)
Observations 4,375 4,375 4,375
Firm-characteristics YES YES YES
Country-characteristics YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 271.69*** 145.564*** 154.614***
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk Wald F statistic 874.85 47.595 71.342
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.766 0.849 0.819
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels accordingly. F-test, for the first stage, and respective under (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistic), weak (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk Wald F statistic) and over-identification (Hansen J
statistic) tests (for the second stage) are reported. All identification tests resoundingly validate
the satisfaction of the necessary conditions.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
Panel A: firm-level variables
Risk 6271 -1.379 0.536
LIFE 6271 0.457 0.498
SIZE 6271 7.063 0.902
STOCK 6271 0.358 0.480
Panel B: country-level variables
GDPGR 6271 2.021 2.891
INFL 6271 2.072 2.121
HHI 6271 0.151 0.149
PREM 5428 4.012 2.325
INSTDEV 6235 1.098 0.629
CAP 5027 90.400 78.971
VOL 5464 20.214 7.772
PDI 6271 49.012 19.859
IDV 6271 64.730 24.060
UAI 6271 57.352 21.381
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 3: National culture and insurers’ risk - The effect of individualism.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Baseline Macro Insurance Institutions Stock Market All
IDV 0.00102** 0.00152*** 0.00132** 0.00213*** 0.00113* 0.00227***
(0.000495) (0.000563) (0.000540) (0.000673) (0.000594) (0.000792)
SIZE -0.0411** -0.0450** -0.0311* -0.0461** -0.0151 -0.0268
(0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0193)
STOCK -0.0527** -0.0534** -0.0438 -0.0586** -0.0485 -0.0404
(0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0278) (0.0265) (0.0300) (0.0298)
LIFE 0.0199 0.0231 0.0218 0.0274 0.0200 0.0281
(0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0314) (0.0310)
GDPGR 0.00434 0.00240
(0.00458) (0.00616)
INFL 0.0122* 0.0143*
(0.00658) (0.00745)
PREM 0.00165 0.0126
(0.00608) (0.00784)
HHI 0.251** 0.235**
(0.102) (0.110)
INSTDEV -0.0668** -0.0371
(0.0260) (0.0376)
CAP -0.000447 -0.000368
(0.000332) (0.000344)
VOL 0.00277 0.00215
(0.00279) (0.00287)
Constant -1.363*** -1.421*** -1.523*** -1.327*** -1.546*** -1.667***
(0.134) (0.133) (0.134) (0.136) (0.152) (0.156)
Observations 6,271 6,271 5,428 6,235 4,882 4,837
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Insurance firms 801 801 794 800 755 755
Countries 42 42 42 41 38 38
For the sake of transparency, in estimating the relationship between national culture and insurance firm risk we use
variations of eq.(2) as reported in columns (1) to (5). More specifically, column (1) represents the baseline model, con-
sidering only firm-specific attributes. In columns (2) to (5) we extend the baseline model by controlling for each set of
country-level variables (e.g. macro, insurance, institutional or stock-market related), as discussed in Subsection 3.1.3.
Column (6) reports results for the overall model, as discussed in Section 3.2 and written in eq.(2), which essentially
embeds all previous variations. All specifications of the model are estimated using random effects generalized least
squares (GLS), the validity of which against their OLS variants are verified by the Breusch and Pagan LM test (un-
reported). Nonetheless, we found no significant differences in using OLS. All regressions are estimated with robust
standard errors clustered by insurance firm, which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 4: National culture and insurers’ risk - The effect of uncertainty avoidance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Baseline Macro Insurance Institutions Stock Market Overall
UAI -0.00259*** -0.00249*** -0.00274*** -0.00268*** -0.00412*** -0.00424***
(0.000615) (0.000621) (0.000643) (0.000618) (0.000756) (0.000811)
SIZE -0.0481** -0.0494*** -0.0381** -0.0497*** -0.0311 -0.0381*
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0197)
STOCK -0.0483* -0.0460* -0.0375 -0.0466* -0.0382 -0.0188
(0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0279) (0.0264) (0.0294) (0.0299)
LIFE 0.0152 0.0188 0.0169 0.0186 0.0170 0.0222
(0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0317) (0.0312)
GDPGR 0.000765 -0.00237
(0.00450) (0.00632)
INFL 0.00828 0.0107
(0.00635) (0.00761)
PREM 0.00252 0.0115
(0.00603) (0.00784)
HHI 0.248** 0.292**
(0.102) (0.115)
INSTDEV -0.0268 0.0113
(0.0199) (0.0334)
CAP -0.00104*** -0.00106***
(0.000335) (0.000351)
VOL 0.00409 0.00336
(0.00286) (0.00293)
Constant -1.101*** -1.128*** -1.237*** -1.058*** -1.084*** -1.181***
(0.144) (0.143) (0.142) (0.150) (0.167) (0.179)
Observations 6,271 6,271 5,428 6,235 4,882 4,837
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Insurance firms 801 801 794 800 755 755
Countries 42 42 42 41 38 38
For the sake of transparency, in estimating the relationship between national culture and insurance firm risk we use vari-
ations of eq.(2) as reported in columns (1) to (5). More specifically, column (1) represents the baseline model, considering
only firm-specific attributes. In columns (2) to (5) we extend the baseline model by controlling for each set of country-level
variables (e.g. macro, insurance, institutional or stock-market related), as discussed in Subsection 3.1.3. Column (6) re-
ports results for the overall model, as discussed in Section 3.2 and written in eq.(2), which essentially embeds all previous
variations. All specifications of the model are estimated using random effects generalized least squares (GLS), the validity
of which against their OLS variants are verified by the Breusch and Pagan LM test (unreported). Nonetheless, we found no
significant differences in using OLS. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by insurance firm,
which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables
are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 5: National culture and insurers’ risk - The effect of power distance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Baseline Macro Insurance Institutions Stock Market Overall
PDI -0.00130** -0.00217*** -0.00173** -0.00392*** -0.00107 -0.00375***
(0.000633) (0.000753) (0.000694) (0.000952) (0.000676) (0.00105)
SIZE -0.0412** -0.0458** -0.0311* -0.0494*** -0.0140 -0.0281
(0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0195)
STOCK -0.0485* -0.0474* -0.0383 -0.0525** -0.0419 -0.0326
(0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0277) (0.0261) (0.0298) (0.0298)
LIFE 0.0166 0.0175 0.0178 0.0220 0.0189 0.0227
(0.0289) (0.0286) (0.0296) (0.0288) (0.0317) (0.0311)
GDPGR 0.00478 0.00110
(0.00464) (0.00612)
INFL 0.0140** 0.0142*
(0.00686) (0.00744)
PREM 0.00113 0.0154**
(0.00623) (0.00784)
HHI 0.255** 0.233**
(0.103) (0.111)
INSTDEV -0.107*** -0.0857**
(0.0299) (0.0431)
CAP -0.000380 -0.000129
(0.000320) (0.000352)
VOL 0.00264 0.00144
(0.00279) (0.00287)
Constant -1.233*** -1.218*** -1.351*** -0.929*** -1.434*** -1.294***
(0.141) (0.139) (0.142) (0.172) (0.158) (0.186)
Observations 6,271 6,271 5,428 6,235 4,882 4,837
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Insurance firms 801 801 794 800 755 755
Countries 42 42 42 41 38 38
For the sake of transparency, in estimating the relationship between national culture and insurance firm risk we use vari-
ations of eq.(2) as reported in columns (1) to (5). More specifically, column (1) represents the baseline model, considering
only firm-specific attributes. In columns (2) to (5) we extend the baseline model by controlling for each set of country-level
variables (e.g. macro, insurance, institutional or stock-market related), as discussed in Subsection 3.1.3. Column (6) re-
ports results for the overall model, as discussed in Section 3.2 and written in eq.(2), which essentially embeds all previous
variations. All specifications of the model are estimated using random effects generalized least squares (GLS), the validity
of which against their OLS variants are verified by the Breusch and Pagan LM test (unreported). Nonetheless, we found
no significant differences in using OLS. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by insurance
firm, which are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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